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A Fuzzy Logic Trust Model for Secure Routing in
Smart Grid Networks
Aljawharah Alnasser, and Hongjian Sun, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—Smart grids require communication networks to
convey sensing and control data for improving the efficiency
of energy generation, transmission and delivery. As a result,
smart girds become vulnerable to various types of cyber-attacks.
Trust models were recognized as one of the important methods
of defending a large communication network against malicious
cyber-attacks. In this paper, a fuzzy logic trust model is proposed
to detect untrusted nodes in smart grid networks, and compared
with an existing model to show its advantages. Using this
proposed model, both the routing efficiency and the detection rate
for all types of considered malicious behaviors can be improved.
In comparison with the existing Lightweight and Dependable
Trust System (LDTS) model, the proposed model improves the
packet dropping rate by up to 90% when the percentage of
malicious nodes is less than 25%, as verified by simulations.
Index Terms—Internet of Things, Smart Grids, Cyber Attacks,
Trust, Fuzzy Logic, Dropping Rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
AS a result of immense widespread of Internet, a newconcept that connects all objects together, known as
Internet of Things (IoT), has emerged. IoT is a new vibrant
research field in both computer networks and electronics
engineering. IoT transforms the Internet from the interaction
between humans only to the interaction between things and
humans, and even the interaction between things. This is
enabled by giving smart devices the ability of thinking, making
decisions without any human intervention, and sharing these
information with other smart devices to achieve a specific goal.
A smart grid is one of the typical application environments
for applying IoT technologies. Electricity companies launched
campaigns for replacing old electricity meters with smart
meters that allow two-way communications between smart
meters and Metering Data Management System (MDMS) [1].
The meter readings can be directly and automatically sent to
MDMS for producing bill etc. without any human intervention.
Smart grid communication architecture consists of three layers
[2], [3], as shown in Fig. 1: first layer is a Home Area Network
(HAN) which consists of all devices within the home or
building that is connected with smart meters; second layer is a
Neighborhood Area Network (NAN) that is composed of many
HANs and a base station (also known as a data concentrator);
and third layer is a Wide Area Network (WAN) where base
stations forward the concentrated metering data to MDMS.
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Fig. 1. Communication infrastructure in smart grid.
In the NAN layer, smart meters create a network to deliver
data to the base stations which make them vulnerable to
internal or external attacks. Internal attacks are very difficult to
detect since the compromised node (smart meter) is considered
as an authenticated node. Therefore, applying traditional se-
curity schemes cannot protect the network from these attacks.
Hence, there is a need of developing new security methods
for dealing with internal attacks. Trust management scheme
is one of the most common techniques that were proposed
for detecting internal attacks [4][5]. Each smart meter in
the network keeps monitoring its neighbors and reports any
misbehaving activity [5]. The compromised node can launch
various types of malicious attacks, such as blackhole attack,
sinkhole attack, injecting false information and jamming the
channels [6]. The smart meters could send the collected data
to the data concentrator through the use of a multi-hop routing
protocol. As a result, the compromised node can inject itself in
the forwarding route and launch attacks to disrupt the routing
protocol. For example, the compromised node could stop
participating in the packet forwarding process. Indeed, recent
works [7] [8] successfully applied trust models to routing
protocols in order to forward the data through a secure route
by considering the trustworthiness degree for all nodes.
The weighted-sum is one of the most common method-
ologies that were used for trust management, where trust
evaluation can be done by giving different weights for each
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trust component [9]. Total trust is computed by
Ttotal =
U∑
i=1
wi × Tx (1)
where wi is a weight value for Tx which is a trust value for a
trust level x such as direct and indirect, and U is the number
of trust levels that will be considered. However, this method
has the following issues [9]. First, setting the optimal weights
(wi) for different trust levels, as shown in equation (1), is very
difficult. Second, in the existing weighted-sum models, trust
levels are typically calculated by using different mathematical
schemes and complex models which can cause high resource
consumption such as processing power. Third, choosing the
optimal threshold values is a challenge for this weighted-sum
method because the trust decision is made by predefining trust
threshold that is typically unknown.
Actually, trust itself is a vague relationship for most in-
stances, and uncertainty is one of its characteristics. It cannot
be strictly treated with the likelihood of probability because the
probability model contains an evaluation of uncertainty. Even
if it becomes feasible, it cannot be generalised for treating
all situations. In trust networks, the evidence to be supported
may be fuzzy, and the policies to be enforced may be fuzzy
too. Thus fuzzy logic, a form of multi-valued logic derived
from fuzzy set theory to deal with reasoning [10], becomes
a good technical choice. Several fuzzy models were studied
to provide a series of fuzzy rules for handling uncertainty
situations, which were used in control systems for decision
making and pattern recognition. Fuzzy logic incorporates a
series of IF-THEN rules to solve a control problem rather than
attempt to mathematically model a system. The main steps of
fuzzy rule-based inference are as follows [11]:
1) Predefine the fuzzy sets and criteria.
2) Initialize the input variable values to the fuzzy engine,
by calculating the degree to which the input basic steps
and condition of the fuzzy rules.
3) Apply the fuzzy rules to determine the output data, by
calculating the rules conclusion based on its matching
degree.
4) Evaluate the results and give certain feedbacks to mod-
erate criteria or rules.
Recently, researchers developed fuzzy logic trust models to
build up trust relationships among sensor nodes. For example,
in [12], a fuzzy logic trust-based model was proposed. Two
sets of parameters were considered as fuzzy inputs. The first
set was a node feature such as sensor readings, and battery
status. The second set was a link feature such as link quality,
received signal strength and packet error rate. However, it
did not consider untrusted nodes that can initiate a malicious
behavior. Renubala and Dhanalakshmi [13] studied a trust
fuzzy logic for enabling secure routing in wireless sensor
networks. The model consists of five parameters: reliability,
residual energy, buffer occupancy, packet generation rate and
speed. The network was protected from the black-hole at-
tack, bad mouthing attack, and contradictory behavior attack.
Also, Chen et al. [14] studied a trust fuzzy logic model
by considering trust evaluation metrics for the establishment
and validation of the trust management model: End-to-end
Packet Forwarding Ratio (EPFR), Average Energy Consump-
tion (AEC) and Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR). The membership
function was created for direct trust and recommendation trust,
however, the past trust was computed as a weighted-sum with
most recent trust.
In this paper, a new fuzzy logic trust-based model is pro-
posed for a smart grid network for detecting untrusted nodes.
The proposed model uses similar mathematical scheme as
that was used in a Lightweight and Dependable Trust System
(LDTS) model [4]. However, different from [4] that used a
fuzzy logic rule to evaluate the trust by maintaining three
linguistic input variables (direct, indirect and past trust), we
develop an adaptive strategy for trust evaluation. In addition,
a comprehensive performance analysis and comparison are
performed for analysing weighted-sum method and fuzzy logic
method, given similar mathematical scheme adopted in both
methods. In brief, the main contributions of this paper are:
1) Different from existing research, this paper first proposes
the use of a new fuzzy logic trust model for protecting
smart grid networks from cyber-attacks.
2) This paper compares the performance of the proposed
model with that of existing weighted-sum trust model,
revealing their advantages and disadvantages.
3) A self-adaptive approach for LDTS model is studied for
trust evaluation.
The paper is organised as follow. Section II proposes the
fuzzy trust model for smart grid networks. Section III illus-
trates the simulation analysis of the proposed model. Section
IV presents its comparison results with LDTS model. Finally,
Section V summarises the overall work performed.
II. PROPOSED SYSTEM MODEL
A. Trust Definitions
Trust measurement is one of the most important schemes
to evaluate the trustworthiness between two nodes. Each node
monitors its neighbors and computes trust values for them. All
nodes in the network applies the trust model as a security tool
to continuously monitor their neighbors’ behavior. The node
that has some misbehaving characteristics can be considered
as a compromised node. Using Fig. 2, trust evaluation is done
in four levels:
Direct Trust: node i computes direct trust by direct obser-
vation of its one-hop neighbors (node n, node m).
Recommendation Trust: node i computes trust value for
two-hops neighbors (node j) using the recommendations from
the common neighbors (node m, node n).
Indirect Trust: node i computes trust value for non-
neighboring nodes (node k) using others nodes recommen-
dations.
Past Trust: each node records the previous trust value of
all nodes to keep track of their behavior.
B. The system model
The considered network consists of one NAN. Each NAN
has a number of smart meters and one base station used as a
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Fig. 2. Trust Evaluation levels
collecting node. These smart meters are equipped with a two-
way communication between meters and substations which
give them the ability to measure and deliver their readings
to the collecting node. Smart meters forward the sensed data
to the collecting node through the use of multi-hop routing
protocol. Because of that, they are assumed to be deployed in
a way that ensures the connectivity with one another through
a wireless communication.
The network is deployed in urban environment for an elec-
tricity monitoring, where each node collects the data and sends
them every hour to the collecting node. At the same time, each
smart meter continuously monitors its neighbors’ behavior and
records these information to calculate direct trust. After each
sending interval, each node sends its feedback (direct trust)
about its neighbors to the collecting node to compute the
global trust. If the collecting node detects untrusted node, it
isolates it from the network and updates the routing table for
each node.
C. Proposed Trust Model
The proposed model is a fuzzy logic trust model for achiev-
ing a secure routing in the network. It gives the ability for
sensor nodes to make a smart decision about the compromised
nodes. The proposed model is composed of four steps.
1) Linguistic inputs (Trust Components): as shown in Fig.
3, the model has three inputs which represent trust levels:
direct trust, indirect trust and past trust.
Direct Trust (Sensor node level). As mentioned before,
NAN is a multi-hop network where nodes are responsible for
forwarding the packets until reach the base station. Node i
forwards the packets to its neighbor node j and keeps moni-
toring node j to verify whether it forwards the packets. The
direct trust DTi,j between node i and node j at time (t) is
measured by
DTi,j(t) =
forwarded Packets
Total Packets
(2)
where forwarded Packets is the number of packets that
node j received from node i and forwarded them successfully.
Total Packets is the total packets that node j received from
node i.
Indirect Trust (Base Station level). The base station broad-
casts a request periodically to collect the direct trust from all
nodes in the network. Indirect trust is a centralized operation
where the base station computes the indirect trust between the
base station and each node in the network based on nodes’
feedback [4]. The base station fills the matrix with the nodes’
feedback using
Feedback =

DT1,1 ... ... DT1,n
: ... ... :
: ... ... :
DTn,1 ... ... DTn,n
 (3)
where n is the number of sensor nodes in the network. Indirect
trust IDBS,i between base station and node i at time (t) is
computed using
IDBS,i(t) =
∑m
k=1(DTk,i)
m
(4)
where m is the number of nodes that have a feedback about
node i, m ≤ n.
Past Trust. The model should keep track of the historical
behavior of each node because that could affect the network
performance. Smart compromised nodes could behave as a
normal and malicious alternatively to escape from the punish-
ment. The past trust TPast at time (t) is computed using the
following equation:
TPast(t) =
∑t−1
i=1 GT (i)
t− 1 (5)
where GT(i) is the global trust that will be defined in step 4.
2) Fuzzification Process: the input linguistic variables are
connected through AND logical operator. The proposed model
uses a triangular and trapezoidal membership functions to map
crisp (input) values to fuzzy sets. The fuzzy numbers H, A,
and L denote High, Average and Low respectively.
First, the membership function of the fuzzy number H is
defined as
MH(x) =

0, x < a1
x−a1
a2−a1 , a1 ≤ x ≤ a2
1, x > a2
 (6)
Fuzzy Logic System Global Trust (t)
Rules
Direct Trust (t)
Indirect Trust (t)
Past Trust (t)
Fig. 3. Proposed Fuzzy Logic Trust Model for Secure Routing in Smart Grid
Networks
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Next, the membership function of the fuzzy number A is
computed as
MA(x) =

0, x ≤ b1
x−b1
b2−b1 , b1 < x ≤ b2
b3−x
b3−b2 , b2 < x < b3
0, x ≥ b3

(7)
Finally, the membership function of the fuzzy number L is
derived by
ML(x) =

0, x > c1
c1−x
c1−c2 , c2 ≤ x ≤ c1
1, x < c2
 (8)
These functions are used because they are computationally
efficient to be applied in sensor nodes. The region boundaries
is changed in direct, indirect and past trust inputs. Table I
presents the region boundaries of each input.
3) Fuzzy Interference Rule-Base: trust values are calculated
by passing the fuzzy sets described above through fuzzy
inference rules. As shown in Fig. 4, Global Trust (GT )
uses Triangular and Trapezoidal Membership Functions which
are specified by three parameters: Malicious, Less Trusted,
Normal. The formal syntax of the first rule in the rule-base,
as an illustration, is given by
IF Direct is Low AND Indirect is Low and Past is Low
then GlobalTrust is Malicious.
(9)
The number of the input linguistic variables is three in the
proposed method and each variable takes three values. Thus,
the total number of rules, with all possible combinations, is
27.
4) Defuzzification (Global Trust - GT (t)): after fuzzifica-
tion, the next step is a defuzzification to get crisp values using
mathematical method. Middle of Maximum (MoM) method of
defuzzification is used, which is an efficient method for the
resource-constraint sensor nodes [15]. The function gets the
middle value of the maximum range of rules aggregation.
III. SIMULATION ANALYSIS
A. Simulation Setup
In our simulations, we considered a network with 16 smart
meters and one base station with parameters as shown in Table
TABLE I
REGIONS BOUNDARIES
Input a1 a2 b1 b2 b3 c1 c2
Direct 0.6 0.8 0.1 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.1
Indirect 0.5 0.8 0.1 0.4 0.8 0.5 0.1
Past 0.6 0.8 0.1 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.1
1
0.5
0
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Malicious Less Trusted Normal
Fig. 4. Membership functions for global trust
II. The meters were randomly distributed over an area of 300×
500 m2 with static locations where node 3 is the base station
(Red node in Fig. 5). All smart meters assumed to have the
same resources.
The attacker tried to compromise a node that located in
hotspot area of the base station. Then, compromised node can
initiate two types of malicious behaviors:
1) Trust attacks: these attacks infect the trust model itself
and make it unable to detect the compromised nodes. The
compromised node always tries to gain high reputation using
non-stable malicious behavior such as:
Contradictory behavior attack: malicious node behaves
normally with a group of neighboring nodes and behaves
maliciously with the others [16].
On-off attack: malicious node behaves normally and ma-
liciously alternately with time. Indeed, it behaves normally
during a specific time interval (t) and behaves maliciously
during the next time interval (t+ 1) [17].
2) Routing attacks: the aim of these attacks is disrupting
the multi-hop routing protocols.
Blackhole attack is the most common routing attacks
where the malicious node drops all received packets. It causes
partition the network where some important information does
1
2 3 (BS)
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
1213
14
15
16
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
Fig. 5. Network Model
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TABLE II
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Parameters Value
Simulation time (rounds) 40
Transmission range (m) 149
Number of sensor nodes 16
Number of malicious nodes 1-4
Simulation area (m2) 300x500
Trust intervals 10
not reach the base station. Also, it decreases the network
performance and increases the end-to-end delay [18].
To measure the performance of our model, we assumed
that node 4 is a compromised node that initiate a blackhole
attack. It drops all received packets from its neighbors (node 1,
node 6, and node 10). In addition to blackhole attack, the
compromised node 4 launches trust attacks to conceal itself
by performing non-stable malicious behavior.
B. Results
1) Detection of contradictory behavior attack: this attack is
difficult to detect because of the various feedback from neigh-
bors of the malicious node. Indeed, compromised node 4
behaves maliciously with node 10 by dropping all packets that
received from that node, and behaves normally with others
(node 1 and node 6). In this situation, node 1 and node 6
will give positive feedback about compromised node 4, while
node 10 has a negative feedback.
Our proposed model gives a high priority for direct trust
which is more accurate because it is based on direct experience
without any external influences. The corresponding result is
shown in Fig. 6. The following remarks can be made:
• node 6 and node 10 consider node 4 as a normal node,
because the monitoring result concluded that all packets
are forwarded by node 4;
• node 10 (victim node) can detect malicious node 4 and
change the route to one that is more trusted.
2) Detection of on-off attack: direct trust value reflects
the most recent status of a nodes behavior which gives
the opportunity for smart attackers to initiate on-off attack
[17]. Because of the limitation of node’s resources, some
trust schemes disregard past interaction experience in trust
measurement.
In this case, we assumed that compromised node 4 initiate
blackhole attack with all nodes in round (n), while it behaves
normally in round (n+1). By inspecting Fig. 7, the following
remarks can be made:
• in round (n), the malicious node can be detected by its
neighbors because the malicious activity is targeted all
neighbors;
• in round (n+ 1), global trust for the compromised node
increases because of its good behavior. However, it is still
considered a malicious node because of its past activities.
Thus, the proposed model can reduce the impact of on-off
attack.
0
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0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Node 1 Node 6 Node 10
G
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b
a
l 
T
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st
Contradictory behavior attack
Fig. 6. Detection of contradictory behavior attack in the proposed model.
3) Detection of blackhole attack: blackhole attacks violate
the availability requirement where the malicious nodes stop
forwarding the packets that they received from reaching the
destination [18]. It reduces the network performance; there-
fore, we implemented our model in the routing protocol to
detect and revoke the compromised node from the routing
tables. Each node chooses the next hop based on the trust
value; as a result, the packet will be forwarded through a
trusted path.
To measure the performance of our model, we run the
simulation many times with a different number of malicious
nodes. We assume a stable behavior of compromised node for
the whole time by dropping all nodes that received from all
neighbors. The result that is shown in Fig. 8 represents the
dropping rate during 10 trust intervals. The following remarks
can be made:
• in general, the dropping rate increases, as long as, the
number of malicious nodes increases;
• if the percentage of malicious nodes is less than 25%, the
dropping rate is very small;
• if the percentage of malicious nodes equals to 25%, the
dropping rate increases to reach 24%.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We use LDTS model [4] as a benchmark to evaluate the
performance of the proposed model.
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Fig. 7. Detection of on-off attack in the proposed model.
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Fig. 8. Dropping rate in the proposed model.
A. Measures definition
LDTS model used various ways to compute global trust
at different levels, we focus on CH level where each CH
measures the direct trust and indirect trust then uses the
weighted-sum method to compute the global trust Oi,j(∆t)
using the following equations:
Oi,j(∆t) = d10× (w1 × Ci,j(∆t) + w2 ×Fi,j(∆t))e (10)
w1 =
Φ(S)
Φ(S) + Φ(g)
, w2 =
Φ(g)
Φ(g) + Φ(S)
(11)
Φ(x) = 1− 1
α+ x
(12)
where Ci,j(∆t) is a direct trust, Fi,j(∆t) is indirect trust. S is
the number of successful interactions of node i with node j
during ∆t, and g is the amount of positive feedback about
node i. w1 and w2 are direct and indirect weighs respectively.
B. Case study 1: Performance Comparison for Trust Attacks
The aim of trust attacks is concealing malicious nodes
from the security model by performing a non-stable malicious
behavior. Considering non-stable behaviors is very important
while designing trust model, because they can be non-visible
to trust model. They allow for the compromised node to stay
longer time and destroy the network. Therefore, we compared
the results of both models in case of trust attacks.
1) contradictory behavior attack: as shown in Fig. 9,
the attack is detected more easily by our model compared
with LDTS model. Because in LDTS, the victim node 10
considered the indirect trust only by giving the priority to
the nodes’ feedback and disregarding its own experience. The
following points present the proof of LDTS result.
• successful interactions between victim node 10 and
malicious node 4 is equal to zero (S=0), where
malicious node 4 drops all packets that are received
from node 10;
• the number of positive feedback about malicious node 4
is equal to two [from node 1 and node 6];
• in this case, the total trust only considers indirect trust,
because the weights are as follow [w1 = 0, w2 = 1],
based on their assumption α = 1.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Contradictory
behavior attack
On-off attack
Global Trust
Performance comparison for trust attacks
LDTS Model
Proposed Model
Fig. 9. Comparison the detection of trust attacks in LDTS and the proposed
model.
Proof:
S = 0 , g = 2,
Φ(S) = 1− 11+0 = 1− 1 = 0
Φ(g) = 1− 11+2 = 1− 0.33 = 0.67
w1 =
0
0+0.67 = 0
w2 =
0.67
0+0.67 = 1
Based on predefined trust threshold (Tth = 0.5) used in [4],
node 10 always considers node 4 as a normal node.
2) On-off attack: the result in Fig. 9 shows the trust value
for the compromised node when it behaves normally in round
(n+ 1). From the result we can conclude the following:
• in the proposed model, the node is considered as mali-
cious node;
• in LDTS model, the node is considered as a fully trusted
node because LDTS scheme only considers past behavior
during a specific period of time (n) and (n + 1) separately.
Therefore, if the compromised node behaves maliciously
during time interval (n), the trust value is low during
this interval. Thereafter, if the compromised node behaves
normally in the next time interval (n+1), the trust value
increases during this interval and disregards the malicious
behavior in previous rounds.
C. Case study 2: Performance Comparison for Blackhole
Attack
In comparison with LDTS model, we measure the improve-
ment percentage of dropping rate in case of stable blackhole
attack. From the result in Fig.10, we can concluded the
following:
• dropping rate in our model is improved by 90% while the
number of malicious nodes is less than 25% of network
nodes;
• When the number of malicious nodes is equal to 25%,
the improvement is decreased to reach 58%.
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Fig. 10. Improvement rate in dropping rate in the proposed model.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a fuzzy logic trust model to
detect malicious nodes that stop forwarding packets. Also, we
considered non-stable behaviors that affect trust model such as
contradictory behavior attack and on-off attack. We compared
this proposed trust model with existing trust scheme LDTS
which used weighted-sum model. Simulation results showed
that our proposed model outperforms LDTS trust model. We
concluded that our proposed model can improve the detection
rate and the network efficiency with lower dropping rate. A
comparison of the proposed model with the LDTS model
showed its superiority and adaptation of detection with almost
all types of nodes. The network performance was improved by
90% while the number of malicious nodes is less than 25%.
Thus, it gives network designers a full package that delivers
trustworthy messages through a safe path with high reliability.
VI. FUTURE WORK
In future work, we will apply the proposed model in real
MICAz sensor motes and compare these practical results with
our simulation results. We could also combine the proposed
trust model with the routing protocol such as (AODV). The
proposed model could be applied to different IoT applications
such as Vehicular Ad-hoc Network (VANET) with mobility
factor.
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